



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

Executive Registry

84 - 7062/2

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

12 December 1984

Mr. John N. McMahon
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. McMahon:

Your presentation at the National War College on December 11, 1984 was superb. We do not have the opportunity to hear frequently from members of the national security decisionmaking community at your level. When we do, it is always a tremendous contribution if the individual is willing to share substantive knowledge in a frank and open manner. You have done all of that and more.


We are most grateful for your taking the time to be with us. On behalf of all the students and faculty you have our deepest thanks and wish for a happy holiday season.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Perry", is written above the typed name.

Perry M. Smith
Major General, USAF
Commandant

Super job! Many thanks.



T-111

Approved For Release 2008/08/20 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800150001-8

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PAO 84-0482

4 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George V. Lauder
Director Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Address of the National War College

1. You will be speaking to the The National War College class of 1985 on "The Role of Intelligence in Policymaking" from 10:00 to 11:30 a.m. in the Arnold Auditorium, Building 61, at Ft. McNair on Tuesday, 11 December. Course Director Colonel Rich Siner (USAF) and [redacted] will meet you at the entrance of the building at 9:50 a.m. and escort you to the auditorium.

25X1

2. Audience: Approximately 160 U.S. military and federal civilian personnel will attend. The students are mostly military officers of Colonel rank but the FBI, State Department, USIA and the CIA will also have representatives.

It will be a closed session and all attendees will have TOP SECRET, no compartmented, clearances. Foreign officers attending the University will not be allowed in the session. The Commandant of the College Major General Perry M. Smith (USAF) will be present. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

3. Speech: The talking points for your speech were forwarded to you previously. You have been asked to speak for 30 minutes, followed by a 15-minute break, then 45 minutes of Q's and A's. A member of the Intelligence Community Staff and a student in the class [redacted] will introduce you and monitor the Q's and A's. A neck mike and a standard microphone and podium will be on stage. Your speech will be taped for our records.

25X1

4. Background: During the month of December the class topic is the Intelligence Community's role in national security planning and decision-making. Last year Bobby Inman addressed the class of '84. The DCI spoke to a joint session of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in December of 1982.

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SUBJECT: Address of the National War College

Attached for your information is background materials on the National Defense University and biographies of:

Major General Perry M. Smith, Commandant



25X1



25X1

George W. Lauder

Attachments

S E C R E T
NOFORN

DCI/PAO [redacted] /4 Dec 84

25X1

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - ER 84-7062/1

1 - PAO Req. 84-0482

1 - [redacted]

1 - PAO Chron

1 - PAO Subj. (MED)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

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
Remarks

Executive Secretary
9/19/84
Date



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319



12 September 1984

ATTN: 84-7062

Mr. John N. McMahon
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. McMahon:


I am pleased to learn from [redacted] that you will be able to address the members of The National War College on Tuesday, December 11, 1984. You are uniquely qualified to assist in providing our students a greater insight into the intelligence community's role in national security planning and decisionmaking--the subject before the class during the month of December.

STAT

We shall also be studying the roles of the President, his special assistant for National Security Affairs, the Defense and State Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Services--all with the goal of grasping the interactions between these key players and the Intelligence Community in national security policy development. We would hope that you could spend one and one-half hours beginning at 10:00 a.m., which would include your presentation and a question and answer period.

The National War College has a well-established policy of holding all remarks in presentations such as yours in strictest confidence. This, I believe, permits the speaker to discuss his subject freely and with complete candor. Additionally, the audience will consist of U. S. military and federal civilian personnel only; all have TOP SECRET clearances.

The enclosed requisite form will provide the needed information for the administrative support of your visit. Please indicate your decisions and return it at your convenience. I would appreciate receiving a copy of your current biography in order to acquaint the student audience with your experience and background.




Colonel Rich Siner, the faculty member directing this portion of our curriculum, will continue to be in touch with your office regarding the specifics of your presentation. Please do not hesitate to call him at 693-8115 if you have any further questions or he can be of any assistance.

We look forward to welcoming you to The National War College on December 11th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Perry M. Smith
Major General, USAF
Commandant

Encl

Requisite for Forthcoming Presentation

SPEAKER: Mr. John N. McMahon

TIME, DAY, DATE: 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, December 11, 1984

TITLE/TOPIC: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI

PLEASE UNDERLINE OR FILL IN NECESSARY INFORMATION AND RETURN TO DEAN OF FACULTY AND ACADEMIC PROGRAMS, NWC IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

1. I (do) (do not) desire NWC to make a hotel reservation for me. N/A

a. If reservation is desired, please state dates and hotel preference, if any _____

b. If reservation is not desired, please state where you can be contacted in the Washington area. _____
(Address and Phone Number)

c. My expected time of arrival in the Washington area will be:
_____ on _____ via _____
(Hour) (Date) (Airline and Flight Number, or other means)

2. It is recommended that you arrive at NWC twenty minutes prior to presentation.

3. I (do) (do not) plan to stay for Discussion Group Meeting.

4. I (will) (will not) use visual aids in my presentation. If affirmative, please indicate what type.

5. The classification on my lecture will be: UNCLASSIFIED _____
CONFIDENTIAL _____ SECRET _____ TOP SECRET _____.

6. I (do) (do not) object to properly cleared visitors at my presentation.

7. Reimbursement and honorarium: The sum of \$ N/A is proposed as reimbursement for your valued assistance to the College. This amount includes governmental limits for transportation costs, a modest honorarium of \$100 and billeting expenses (if appropriate). (For U.S. Federal employees, only travel and billeting costs can be reimbursed.)

(If this arrangement is acceptable, PLEASE INITIAL _____.)

(Signature)

(NWFA)
NWC Form 9
Nov 83

Page Denied

Executive Registry
SA-7062

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McMahon

called from the National War College. STAT
He would like you to address the War College the morning of 11 December (a Tuesday). It would be a 45 minute presentation followed by Q's & A's. Audience would be all of National War College save for the foreigners; i.e., audience would be entirely American with minimum of top secret clearance--about 200 people including faculty. He would like you to speak on role of intelligence in national security decisionmaking process from both IC and CIA viewpoint.

Accept X

Hold off

Regret

RSVP:

P.S.

Get DD1 & prepare ^{kgt} speech

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

STAT

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from the controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT (COLLATERAL)

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NO. PAGES	NO. OF ATTACHMENTS (CIA T.S. # of Attachment)		BRANCH, BADGE #, OR LOCATION			LOGGED BY	
SUBJECT: DDCI Remarks to the National War College							
CIA SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR				EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR			
DIRECTORATE DCI	OFFICE/BRANCH OLL		AGENCY C		CONTROL NUMBER		COPY NO.
<p>ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.</p>							
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DDCI (Attn: [redacted])							
<p>When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and forwarded to the Agency Top Secret Control Office.</p>							
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TO		BY (Signature)		TO			
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30 November 1984

NOTE TO:

FROM:

STAT

SUBJECT: DDCI Remarks to the National War College

Attached are the talking points for McMahon's address to the National War College. The audience has TOP SECRET clearances. I have spent a good deal of time talking with the head of the course. They wish McMahon to talk about intelligence's relationship to the policy community. They use a case-study type of approach and would also like him to give examples of intelligence "successes" and "failures." The talking points are new material, not the usual substantive topics we send McMahon.

Also attached are some of the reading materials for the course, a description of the section McMahon is addressing, as well as an article by Helene Boatner in Studies which is very good and from which I drew some of the information for the talking points.

STAT

Attachments

How well do we do?

THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE *

Helene L. Boatner

Facing the press after the Bay of Pigs disaster, President John F. Kennedy quoted an old saying: "Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."¹ A colleague at CIA has adapted this bit of wisdom to the business of intelligence analysis as "Failure has many fathers; success is an orphan." Our failures attract a great deal of attention, while our successes usually go unheralded—and sometimes unrecognized even by ourselves. Our greatest successes occur when nothing happens.

In evaluating the contribution of intelligence to US foreign policy, there are two major issues:

- How successful are we (which depends on how you define our role in the policy process)?
- How successful can we reasonably expect to be (which varies greatly by topic)?

Intelligence and Policy

The role of intelligence in the policy process is a longstanding topic of debate—among intelligence analysts, among policy officials and between the two groups.² The issue was a favorite topic of Sherman Kent, who headed the Office of National Estimates from 1952 through 1967.

For analysts, the fundamental question is how intrusive a role intelligence should play.

- Those who are purists on the question of separating intelligence from policy would prefer to deliver authoritative judgments—buttressed by facts, when available—and watch the policymakers accept those judgments and act accordingly.
- At the other extreme are analysts who argue for intimate involvement at all stages during the formulation and execution of foreign and defense policy.

Consumers, for their part, have varying views of what intelligence should do for them.

- Some believe intelligence units exist to deliver facts in response to their questions and that policymakers should make the analytic judgments, as well as the policy decisions that follow.

* This article is adapted from a paper prepared for the twenty-fifth annual convention of the International Studies Association, March 1984, Atlanta, Georgia.

Evaluation

- Other policymakers value analysis, forecasting, and speculation in principle, and want the intelligence community to take the initiative in raising issues. But even they often resent such offerings if they happen to run contrary to existing policy or to the policy preferences of the individual.

The two groups have somewhat different perspectives on the relative importance of the situation abroad to the policy decisions being made.

- Intelligence analysts typically see foreign developments within their purview as the central issue for policymakers—they expect the policymakers to do what is “right” on their accounts. They like to believe that the intelligence input to decisions is of prime importance. And they take pride in seeing the world “as it is.”
- Policymakers are usually juggling a variety of foreign and domestic considerations within the confines of a particular view of how the world should operate—a policy perspective.
- Normally, moreover, policymakers see a shapeable world, while intelligence analysts see a less tractable world.

Early debates on this subject emphasized the dangers of close interaction between the two groups. Kent, for example, was something of a purist, believing that too much contact with the policy community could undermine the objectivity of our work. My own view of our role, after listening to a decade of criticism of our work as not relevant enough to the real concerns of policymakers, lies more toward the activist end of the spectrum and strongly in favor of analysis and estimating. I would define our job as contributing to formulation and execution of policies that have a good chance of succeeding.

- In my opinion, we cannot contribute effectively unless we are involved in the process.
- Assembling facts and making them intelligible is a vital function, but the judgments we draw are the essence of our business—and by far the hardest part of the job.
- To maintain the independence of our judgments, however, our involvement must stop short of policy advocacy.
- Drawing that line is not easy. The lure of actually making policy is ever-present and seductive. A former chief of Israeli Military Intelligence summed it up eloquently: an intelligence chief who gets too close to the policy process “is then unable to detach himself from the festivities of policymaking just like the other self-gratified members of the court who bask in their connections with power.” *

The basic argument for involvement is that intelligence officers need to know what is going on in the US Government in order to contribute in a timely and effective manner. And policy officials are prone to keep their initiatives, and the options under consideration, secret from anyone who is not involved in the deliberations. Ray Cline has made no secret of the fact that he resigned as head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

* See “The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle” following this article.

Evaluation

Research because Henry Kissinger would not share information that was essential to effective intelligence support, and Cline cites such secrecy as a major cause of intelligence failure.⁴ There is no element more important to good intelligence support for the policy process than a clear set of priorities established, and continually revised, at the policy level—a point made in the final report of the Church Committee and nearly every other study done on the subject.⁵ Only by sitting in on the policy deliberations can we detect the shifting needs for intelligence support in a timely fashion.

Reasonable Expectations

Intelligence analysts can be certain of two things beyond death and taxes:

- They will make errors. (Even if they never go beyond reporting facts, some of those “facts” will be wrong.)
- Their message will usually be unwelcome, since they usually will be pointing out problems and drawing attention to obstacles facing the policymaker.

Not surprisingly, therefore, intelligence analysis is a profession that appeals to the brave, the dour, and the aspiring martyr.

In judging the quality of analysis, a number of factors have to be considered. Accuracy (on both facts and judgments) is one key ingredient. Timeliness is another—if the analysis does not arrive before the critical US decisions are made, it serves no useful purpose. Effective delivery—a clear message forced to the attention of the people who need it—is another essential. Finally, objectivity is the characteristic that separates intelligence analysis from advocacy or from catering to the policy preferences of our customers. Of these, accuracy and objectivity are the two that come in for the greatest amount of discussion.

How right or how wrong we can expect to be varies a lot by topic.

- Some distinctions are obvious, like our differing access to facts in open versus closed societies.
- Concealment and deception are potential hazards on many subjects.
- But the accuracy of our assessments also depends on whether relationships between the facts we have and the ones we lack are fixed (physics), generally predictable within some range (economics), or highly irregular (politics). The more human decisions affect the relations between the known and unknown facts, the harder it is for an analyst to assess the present, to say nothing of predicting the future.
- Moreover, the future is always to some degree governed by the intentions of human beings; intentions are always hard to glean and subject to change.
- The problem is compounded if you are dealing with advanced technologies. The object of your analysis is not merely a machine or weapon but also a scientist, or group of them, who may have made a

Evaluation

major technological breakthrough or a major technological mistake. In either case the decisions to apply the technological developments to actual weapons development will be made by human beings balancing a wide range of political, economic, and military considerations.

To make matters more challenging, it is the discontinuities we are trying to predict. Henry Kissinger once commented that "all intelligence services congenitally overestimate the rationality of the decisionmaking process they are analyzing," and he is certainly correct.⁶ Some of our most famous "failures" have involved this factor. But any analyst who begins with the presumption that all decisionmaking processes are irrational and likely to produce irrational results is left with nothing to analyze. This approach is about as helpful as an admonition to believe only reliable intelligence, about which Clausewitz commented: "What is the use of such feeble maxims? They belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribblers of systems and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas."⁷ The trick is to remind ourselves constantly that irrationality is possible and accidents happen. We also have to remind our readers that non-Western thought processes can lead to decisions that might appear illogical or irrational to us but are entirely sensible in another cultural context.

In very general terms—and subject to many exceptions—I would characterize the spectrum of difficulty in intelligence analysis as follows:

1. The easiest task is to report on implementation of a decision already made that involves a wealth of straightforward evidence:

- an army on the move,
- policies and actions of organized groups in an open society,
- construction, production, or delivery of physical objects (ships, grain, oil, tanks).

For problems of this sort, the most important job of an analyst is what we practitioners call collection tasking—figuring out what you need to know to follow the problem and how that information can be obtained.

Unfortunately, dealing with the "easy" questions is seldom enough. More often, the important questions we face deal with decisions not made or evidence that is not clear. We are asked to assess the reactions of various countries to alternative US policy moves, to predict the outcomes of wars on the basis of imperfect knowledge of opposing armies, and to make economic forecasts without access to vital economic data. Generally speaking—and my own background as a political analyst no doubt influences my thinking—I would say that military analysis is somewhat "easier" than economic analysis and economic somewhat "easier" than political analysis—in the sense of the probability of being "right"—but not in the sense of the need for rigor, experience, and training.

In sum, we are not soothsayers. We cannot predict the future with confidence. But we can reduce the range of uncertainty facing the policy-maker, promote more thorough and enlightened debate within the policy

Evaluation

community, examine the probable consequences of policy alternatives, and alert our customers to possible disrupting events and potential areas for progress toward US objectives. If we do these things effectively, we have succeeded, in my view.

Consumer Reaction

Consumer reaction to our various products varies considerably, but all our attempts to survey consumers show consistent results.

- Receptivity to what we call basic intelligence (“give me the facts”) is uniformly high. People throughout the government appreciate access to a storehouse of biographic material, maps, directories of foreign government officials, data on weapons, economic statistics, population figures, insider reports on cabinet meetings or terrorist plans, and a variety of other data. In short, customers value transfer of knowledge from us to them.
- Reactions to our regular current intelligence products are more mixed—from comments that they are uniformly good to charges that they are superficial. (In large measure I think the variation relates as much to what the particular customer expects as to what we deliver.)
- We get consistently high marks for our responsiveness to requests for products tailored to the specific needs of policymakers engaged in crisis management, because sensible decisions cannot be made in fast-breaking situations without up-to-date information. (If you were reading your daily newspapers after the tragic shootdown of a Korean airliner last year, you got a good example of the amount of detail we can pull together in a hurry when the situation demands it.)

The greatest criticism of US intelligence analysis has always focused on “estimates”—a form of the art that refers to longer range predictions and usually carries a connotation of intelligence community participation. Many customers feel that they can project the future as well as we, if they have the same facts. And they are particularly prone to be critical if they do not like the conclusions we reach. Dick Betts, for example, has cited Lyndon Johnson’s view that negative CIA assessments on Vietnam were undermining the policy process, not contributing to it.⁸ Perversely, policymakers have also been known to dismiss our estimative work as unnecessary if it happens to support existing policies, although President Johnson was delighted with our gloomy findings on the Soviet economy in the early 1960s and President Carter was similarly pleased with our estimates of the world oil outlook.⁹

Certain peculiarities of the human thought process also increase the level of criticism on estimates. Numerous experiments demonstrate that knowing the outcome of any situation inevitably leads ex-post-facto judges to perceive that outcome as much more likely—hence more predictable—than it was. And as Roberta Wohlstetter has argued in her brilliant post-mortem on Pearl Harbor, hindsight also makes it much easier to separate “signals” from “noise.”¹⁰

*Evaluation***Strengths and Weaknesses**

For someone who is on the inside of the intelligence establishment to try to assess the quality of our work in a public forum presents certain practical difficulties. For one thing, my objectivity is suspect. Moreover, most in-depth examinations of the product in the past have taken the form of "post-mortems"—which is to say, examinations of situations in which intelligence failed, at least in part, to warn of impending trouble or to accurately predict events. A number of our internal evaluation efforts of this sort have gotten into the public domain, notably via the Pike Committee. As a result, our failures are fairly well documented on the public record, while our successes are not. But even some of the failures involved elements of success. Success is, in any event, difficult to judge.

For example, we clearly did not predict that the Soviets would introduce missiles into Cuba in 1962. But did the fundamental error of judgment lie with US intelligence or with the Soviets? Our judgment was based on a careful assessment, reached after serious consideration, that the Soviets were not prepared for the major confrontation with the US that such a move would entail. And our reason for our judgment turned out to be correct—they were not prepared for confrontation and when it came they reversed themselves. So we were fundamentally right about the USSR's strategic position, although we erred in assuming that the Soviets would correctly assess the strength of US reaction to such a move. Moreover, intelligence performance during the missile crisis was superb—reporting and analysis provided all the information needed to force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles.¹¹

Then there is the problem of self-defeating prophecy. If we judge that one country is planning an action that is undesirable from the US perspective, and if the US undertakes a private demarche, and if the action does not occur, have we succeeded or not? Did US representations to New Delhi and Moscow during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 dissuade the Indians from their reported plans to try to destroy the Pakistani army in West Pakistan? Or were there no such plans, as the Indians claimed, and many US officials believed?¹²

Yet another problem is action and reaction. Much has been written on the accuracy of our estimates of Soviet strategic weapons deployments over time. And there is no doubt that we have made mistakes, as well as a number of "right" estimates, in this area. But the political impact of intelligence judgments may well have had a major impact on weapons trends. Here the argument is that the "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s led to a major US defense buildup. The Soviets, in response, accelerated and expanded programs already underway (and tried to put missiles in Cuba). The buildup on their part led in turn to perceptions in Europe and the US that the West faced an increasing threat and to a buildup by the US that is now in its early stages.¹³

There is also the difficulty of how human beings use evidence. Psychological research indicates that readers typically underestimate how much they learn from new facts or new analyses—and hence give less credit than they should to the contributions of intelligence to their own knowledge or thought

Evaluation

processes.¹⁴ This, too, is illustrated by Henry Kissinger's belief that it was he who made the analytic leap in 1970 from soccer fields near a naval facility in Cuba to an increased Soviet naval presence there; he has no doubt completely forgotten that he heard it first from the intelligence analysts. And he also does not seem to realize that it turned out to be an analytic error; we learned later that soccer had become quite popular in Cuba by 1970 and was not a good indicator of Soviet presence.¹⁵

That said, let me offer my own opinion of our historical track record and the present state of affairs with regard to quality of analysis. There is no gainsaying that we have made some major errors—the Middle East war of 1973 and the overthrow of the Shah are two of the most notable. However, most of the attention to our work on the 1973 war has centered on our negative assessments immediately before the war broke out; far less mention has been made of very good work a few months earlier, both in an interagency paper and in the Department of State, pointing to the possibility of war by fall and outlining in some detail the events that might bring about such a result. At that juncture, we clearly understood that Sadat might initiate a war for political reasons, knowing that he would not win militarily. By the time the war began, our analytic perspective had shifted, and we discounted war because we were confident that the Arabs could not win and that they knew it. The real question, therefore, is why we lost sight of the right answer, not why we never found it.¹⁶

On Iran, the public report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence dealing with intelligence performance faults the users of intelligence equally with the producers—for their lack of receptivity to the negative information they did receive, as well as their failure to question their own confidence in the Shah.¹⁷ Kissinger argues that Iran was not primarily an intelligence failure but rather a conceptual failure in understanding the impact of rapid economic development.¹⁸ For my own part, I believe that our misestimates of how the Iranian situation would evolve lay less with our lack of understanding of the social forces at work—although we certainly did not do well on that score—than with our belief that the Shah had accurate information about his own country and would act effectively to handle the situation.

We have also made some relatively inconsequential mistakes that have been blown all out of proportion for political reasons. For example, we discovered a Soviet brigade in Cuba in the fall of 1979 that had probably been there undetected for years. Substantively, this mattered little. But the political climate of the time was highly charged and the matter of the brigade got linked to the very contentious issue of SALT ratification. Consequently it was the subject of glaring headlines and heated exchanges—in the US and between the US and the USSR.¹⁹

The public focus on such errors has left an erroneous impression that intelligence seldom spots impending developments before they are obvious to all. As I said at the beginning, our greatest successes leave few ripples, and most are not a matter of public record. But some are. For example, we correctly alerted policymakers to the impending Sino-Soviet split at a time

Evaluation

when conventional wisdom held that the USSR and China were still firm allies. We alerted President Eisenhower and the National Security Council to the possibility of a Soviet earth satellite several months before the first Sputnik was launched, and we have been highly successful in predicting the advent of major new Soviet strategic systems well before they have become operational. We were very accurate in predicting the timing of the first Chinese nuclear explosion. We did a remarkable job on the Arab-Israeli war of 1967—predicting it, predicting who would win, and predicting how long it would last. And this was done in the face of great skepticism at the senior policy level. Thomas Powers cites this performance as the single most important factor accounting for the high regard in which Richard Helms was held by the Johnson Administration. We were right—much to the displeasure of many in the policy community—in judging in 1969 that the Soviet SS-9 missile would not have a MIRV capability. We made some mistakes on certain tactical or specific questions concerning Vietnam—notably with regard to the Tet offensive of 1968 and the role of Sihanoukville as a transshipment point. But the overall record of intelligence assessments on Vietnam from 1954 on is very good, and especially so considering the political pressures involved.²⁰

More recently, our work on Soviet oil production, while initially flawed by inadequate consideration of the ability of the USSR to finance oil imports at the level we suggested, destroyed the then prevalent assumptions about Soviet oil production capabilities (and incidentally probably caused the Soviets to increase their resource commitments to energy production). Our examination of alternative withdrawal lines was vital to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai. We began discussing the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan months before it happened, and we were right about Soviet reluctance to invade Poland. Recent reports of the two congressional oversight committees have given us good marks on predicting the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, on forecasting the world oil market, on alerting the Carter administration to the possibility of a mass emigration from Cuba, on Central America (with particular kudos for our work on Nicaragua in the period before and after Somoza was overthrown and our work on the Salvadoran guerillas), and on Soviet involvement in international terrorism.²¹

Indeed, in the long run, I believe that much of the criticism of intelligence analysis in recent years, sparked in large measure by public release of some of our own post-mortems, has had efficacious results. The fact that the analytic elements of the intelligence community were understaffed and underfunded emerged clearly, and you may have noted that we are actively recruiting for personnel these days. Less noticeably, we have the funds necessary to finance foreign travel, support conferences, let contracts, and underwrite training—all essential to improving our capabilities. One major benefit that stems from these more generous budget allocations is increased interaction with the private sector, which helps to counteract a tendency to insularity. And we have examined our own ways of doing business and made some changes.

From my perspective, there are several key areas where I think we can still do better. We don't put as much emphasis as I think we should on the

Evaluation

responsibility of analysts for guiding intelligence collection assets in an active way. We have been habituated to making our best estimate of how a particular situation will evolve; we need to move further than we have toward examining less likely outcomes if they have significant implications. Examination of alternative outcomes has to leave room for the possibility that one or another actor will have motives we do not fully understand or a view of the "facts" we do not share. We still tend to seek consensus when "point-counterpoint" might be more effective and helpful for our consumers. We are presently well attuned to the policy process at the highest levels of government, but we need to do better at forging links with policymakers at lower levels, so we can find out what kinds of research and analysis can make the greatest contribution to the process. We need to do better at ensuring that our products reach the people who need them. And we need to encourage more movement of people into the intelligence business at middle and senior levels and more movement back and forth between the analytic, policy, academic, scientific, and business communities.

We have our strengths as well. Critics notwithstanding, we have excellent personnel. We work in a "can do" environment—intelligence analysts as a group are willing to put out the effort to produce what is needed, when it is needed, using the information available to them. They accept midnight phone calls, canceled vacation plans, and wasted theater tickets as part of the job. And we have been given a clean bill of health on the politicization issue by a long string of investigators, including our oversight committees.²² We have access to a massive amount of information that really does provide unique insights into foreign capabilities and foreign intentions. In the studies I and my group have done, we have consistently found more to praise than to criticize.

Evaluation

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Topic 10: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI

Tuesday
11 December 1984
1000-1130
L

A. General:

The lecture will bring our attention to the intelligence community, the quality of the intelligence product, and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence in the national security decisionmaking process. It will provide another first-hand opportunity to become acquainted with an individual current in the issues, and to learn his perspective on the process and interactions with the other major agencies.

For background information, a relatively current review of the intelligence process and the coordination of national intelligence may be useful to you. A skimming of the supplementary reading by Stephen J. Flanagan should help in that regard. The other supplementary reading, the CIA Fact Book, has some worthwhile factual information on the organization and structure of the Agency and the intelligence community.

The product of the intelligence community has been widely criticized by many observers of the national security scene. One wonders if our expectations may be too high, or whether we need to find better ways both to produce intelligence analysis and to organize the overall intelligence effort.

The reading by William Casey acts as a beginning framework for your appreciation of the historical trends in the intelligence community and the aspirations of the DCI to make improvements. Gordon McCormick points his finger at a possible explanation of failures in intelligence which are centered in commensurate failures to look at the cultural and historical foundations of the societies that we analyze. The third reading alludes to this as a partial explanation for failure in the case of our efforts to diagnose the situation in Iran prior to 1978. More fundamentally, it suggests basic structural problems may be the root cause of failures.

Critics charge, in particular, that the complex and time-consuming interagency process by which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are written and coordinated smothers competing judgments and hides the existence of gaps in information. The interagency process normally includes representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Military Services

Intelligence Staffs, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

With respect to the role of the DCI, he has a variety of difficult and sometimes conflicting responsibilities: to produce "national" intelligence for the President and the NSC, to coordinate the intelligence activities of the various government departments, to serve as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser, and to manage the CIA. To carry out these responsibilities, he must depend on the personal support of the President for the Secretaries of State and Defense have steadfastly opposed centralized management of intelligence. The DCI prepares the national intelligence budget and reviews the intelligence programs of the various Departments and Agencies. But he does not actually control any part of the intelligence community budget except for the CIA. He commands only the analysts in CIA and the collection assets of the Clandestine Service. Finally, the DCI confronts a potential conflict of interest between his role as DCI and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Having said all of the above, it is important to keep the degree of the problem in perspective. We draw on a useful piece of research and analysis by Mark Lowenthal to help us do that as he addresses the "Burdensome Concept of Failure." In addition, the short exposition by Michael Handel provides some helpful observations on where we can look for possible improvements to the system. Finally, we include a short article by Leslie Gelb which once again illustrates the functioning of the "NSC System". The article focuses on an intelligence area that seems to be getting more attention and support recently in an effort to correct those deficiencies of the 1970's mentioned in DCI Casey's first reading.

B. Issues for Consideration:

Today, we have the chance to address the Deputy DCI in a classified session. The readings should have generated much food for thought and questions. The following are some additional suggestions:

1. What should the President expect from the intelligence community in terms of information, warning, and predictions? Time and again, first intelligence reports during a crisis are fragmentary and confusing. The Korean airline incident in the summer of 1983 appears to be a case in point. Should the President and the NSC expect anything different? Does this argue against any public statements being made by senior officials for the first 24 hours of a crisis situation? Would this abdicate their responsibilities to the press?

2. How can we improve the quality and timeliness of the products of the intelligence community? Should organizational changes be made, e.g., through:

--the establishment of a single analytical agency which would bring together the analysts from CIA, DIA, and INR;

--the separation of the analysts from the collectors of intelligence, e.g., CIA analysts from the clandestine operators;

--the delegation of responsibility for producing separate estimates to CIA and DIA, each using all the intelligence sources but neither coordinating with the other?

3. Can the DCI ensure that the intelligence community judgments are in fact objective and independent of the policy preferences of the President and the Departments of State and Defense?

4. Often, NSC principals make and implement policies based on different intelligence information supplied by their own intelligence agencies. Should something be done to consolidate the information early in a crisis? How should it be coordinated for longer range planning so that it does not get watered down?

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ON PAGE **A-1**

NEW YORK TIMES

11 June 1984

SHIFT IS REPORTED ON C.I.A. ACTIONS

Reagan Is Said to Limit Group Ruling on Covert Moves

By **LESLIE H. GELB**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10 — Early in his term, President Reagan abolished interdepartmental consultations for covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency, a move that continues to influence the number and character of covert operations, according to former and present senior officials of the Administration.

In interviews last week, the officials said the President abandoned the long-standing procedure in favor of discussions and decision-making by a small group of senior political and national security advisers. One result of the reorganization, some officials said, was a fivefold increase since the last year of the Carter Administration to over 50 continuing operations.

Reducing Risk of Disclosures

The intent of this reorganization, the officials said, was to reduce the risk of unauthorized news disclosures. But according to knowledgeable officials, the result has been a sharp and steady expansion of covert actions by the C.I.A., a result in part of the organizational shift.

About half of the 50 continuing operations are said to be in Central America, with a large percentage in Africa as well.

These programs include everything from paramilitary operations to funneling money to friendly hands, to the collection of information by individuals in sensitive positions.

Administration Opinion Divided

Opinion is sharply divided within the Administration over whether suitable personnel have been available to carry out all of these sensitive activities, whether proper control at the policy level has been maintained and whether the accomplishments have been worth the risks.

Where officials agree, however, is that the reorganization removed from the review process most of those military and diplomatic experts in a position to judge feasibility, risks and con-

nections to other policies and activities. The one exception has been operations in Central America, almost all of which, officials said, have been conceived and nurtured at the upper floors of the State Department and in the Inter-American Affairs Bureau.

Planning Group Established

Soon after his inauguration, Mr. Reagan set up what he called the National Security Planning Group to deal with particularly important issues in an informal setting, according to the former and present officials. In addition to the President, the planning group members are said to include Vice President Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger; Robert C. McFarlane, the national security adviser; William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence; James A. Baker 3d, White House chief of staff; Michael K. Deaver, Mr. Baker's deputy, and Edwin Meese 3d, the President's counselor.

As distinguished from formal National Security Council meetings, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a member, the officials said, nor are aides generally allowed to attend.

When intelligence activities are discussed, the Attorney General is invited, along with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the officials said, adding that Mr. Casey was also usually accompanied by his deputy for clandestine operations.

As a general rule, officials said those at the meetings were given no advance notification that proposed covert operations were to be discussed at a meeting. They said papers normally prepared by the C.I.A. were passed out at the meeting itself and then collected at the end of the meeting. According to knowledgeable sources, Mr. Reagan usually makes his decision at the table.

No Advice From Staff

Thus, according to the sources, those who attend are often without the benefit of staff advice before or during the meeting.

It is troubling to several officials that people able to give professional judgments are absent and that political advisers with no background in these matters are present.

"There's nobody there to tell these guys what the problems will be, what could go wrong," one official said.

Another policy-level official said, "There is also the problem that the people at the top of this Administration are fascinated with covert operations and find it easier to approve them than to discuss complicated diplomatic matters."

Mr. Casey, in particular, was cited as a strong advocate of clandestine action. Several sources said he did so on several occasions against the advice of C.I.A. agents and analysts.

Most of the sources agreed that the C.I.A. as an institution had not been a strong promoter of covert operations since the early 1970's — after Congress-

sional investigations of these activities, after many of the operations began to seep into the public domain, risking exposure of agents, and after many covert agents were dropped from the agency's rolls.

Reagan Aware of 'Carping'

A former senior official said Mr. Reagan was aware that "carping" by the departments would occur as a result of his reorganization. But this former official said the President wanted his senior advisers to focus on the issues themselves and not have people around always saying why things could not be done.

By all accounts, however, Mr. Reagan's stated goal was to preserve secrecy.

The officials interviewed acknowledged that this involved a judgment on the part of senior White House aides and the President that most of the disclosures were coming from key Pentagon and State Department personnel rather than from senior levels or from Congress. By law the President must tell Congressional intelligence committees of covert operations and certify they are in the national interest.

These officials insisted that by and large secrecy had been maintained, and that given the volume of clandestine operations now under way the overwhelming number remained secret. In any event, they said the President was prepared to accept the trade-off between losing the value of expert advice and holding down the chances of public disclosure.

Previous administrations made the choice the other way. Sometime during the first Eisenhower Administration, a special group was set up to approve and monitor covert operations. It was first known as the 54/12 Group, then the 303 Committee in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and then under Presidents Nixon and Ford as the 40 Committee. In each case the designation derived from the code number of the decision document creating the group.

Security Adviser Was Chairman

From the 1960's on, the chairman of the group was the President's national security adviser. Group members included the Deputy Defense Secretary, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Assistant Secretaries of State usually attended when the proposed "black" operation was to be in their region of the world, and papers were normally distributed in advance of the meetings.

President Carter upgraded the members to include the Secretaries of State and Defense, in what was called the Security Coordinating Committee for Intelligence. But most of the meetings remained at the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary level.

Reading Material for the ...

FORUM

political leaders should involve explicit simultaneous consideration of a high-risk/low-probability estimate of enemy action with the possible range (small as it may be) of low-risk/low-cost responsive options that offer a hedge against such action. Decisionmakers will be less prone to cognitive dissonance, paralysis, or reluctance to consider threatening possibilities if there is some way to do so that does not pose grave difficulties. The danger in this is that it might result in making an insufficient response. But unless the threat is unambiguous—in which case there is no problem for prediction or decision—it is more likely that no appreciable response will be undertaken quickly than that leaders will decide to do less than they would have without such an exercise.

None of these suggestions offer path-breaking solutions because the analytical dilemmas are inherent in the intellectual and political problems of intelligence and decision. Intelligence collection is not so hampered by dilemmas, although it faces tradeoffs and uncertainties in resource allocation. Predicting dire threats that are not highly probable, but require expensive or unpleasant hedges (such as military alerts or mobilization that will prove controversial if they later seem unnecessary) is a tricky business, and such predictions will often be wrong. If analysts strive to minimize the incidence of predictive error, however, they will rely on assumptions that have the best track records—that is, dominant concepts and normal theories—and thus increase the chances that by being right most of the time they will be wrong in rare but critical instances. A warning officer, therefore, should not be judged on how high his batting average is; if he is almost never wrong, he is not warning enough. The other extreme, excessive numbers of warnings, also undercuts the function with the "cry wolf" problem. Thus warners who bat either .900 or .100 are not performing well, although it is best to err on the side of caution. Perhaps averages on the cautious side of the middle—say .250 to .400—are the best evidence of a satisfactory job.

RICHARD K. BETTS

Surprise, Perceptions, and Military Style

by Gordon H. McCormick

Strategy and the difficult process of evaluating the strategic behavior of adversaries has long been based on the presumed rationality of nation-states. Nations, much like individuals in the marketplace, are considered to be utility-maximizing agents. Behavior is thought to flow from a set of objectives derived from national interests, and policy is an attempt to achieve these objectives at minimal cost, given the environmental con-

ORBIT WINTER 1983 • 833

straints bounding the options available to decision. Approved For Release 2008/08/20 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800150001-8

view, is effectively a problem in applied economics. Having defined the national interest and considered the various political, economic, and military constraints limiting action, the problem left to the strategist is thought to be the relatively simple one of devising the most cost-effective method of realizing the desired effect.

While the assumption of rationality in strategic analysis is intuitively appealing and is, indeed, an essential tool for defining the problems and opportunities facing enemy decisionmakers, it is also, unfortunately, subject to frequent misapplication. The source of this problem lies in the failure to distinguish between the process of strategy and the assumptions and perceptions from which the formulation of strategy proceeds. Where the former is an act of calculation, and, thus, by definition is a rational process, the latter are highly subjective, and are consequently not easily reducible to rational explanation. As Ken Booth has observed in his useful *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, "Although strategy itself might be conceived as a universal preoccupation, [this] does not mean that it is conceived in universal terms."¹ While in one sense nations, like individuals, might usefully be thought of as utility maximizers, it is, at the same time, important to note that they are both at the mercy of their assumptions and their perceptions of the world around them.

The importance of perceptions in the formulation of strategic policy cannot be underestimated. As Richards Heuer has pointed out, "Perception is demonstrably an active rather than a passive process; it constructs rather than records reality."² Not only, therefore, are perceptions the foundation upon which policy is based, but it is also evident that the accuracy of these perceptions is not especially significant for the policymaking process. It is images of reality, rather than reality itself, that determine the behavior of states. The fact that an adversary's perceptions correspond only loosely to the actual situation, therefore, will have little influence on how he will choose to respond. With this in mind, it is not surprising that national actors with distinctive world views will generally respond to what seems to be the same set of circumstances in very different ways. Such differences will occur despite the fact that each, from its own perspective, may well be operating in a purely rational fashion.

Strategic behavior, then, like all matters of human activity, is quite relative to time and place. The origins of this relativism lie, in large part, in the distinctive cultural and historical traditions of nations. Cultural and historical experiences pervade all aspects of national life. In

ifiable ways, they bind a people together as a national or social group. In doing so, they also play an important role in defining the perceptual foundations of national strategy. That the cultural relativism of strategic behavior is frequently lost on military observers and commentators is reminiscent of Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." In focusing on the presumed rationality of enemy behavior, the analyst frequently fails to consider the fact that this behavior, while perhaps rational in its own terms, is rooted in perceptions of the world that are not themselves rational or universally shared. To the degree that national strategy is based on subjective assumptions, it cannot be approached in a purely objective manner.

Divergent traditions have, over time, resulted in distinctive "styles" of national behavior. More important for our purposes here, they have also resulted in distinctive strategic "styles" or modes of thought and action. Nations frequently manifest unique patterns of art, music, or cuisine, and they frequently differ in the way they go to war. These stylistic differences can have a major impact on every area of military decision-making, from the types of forces procured to how they are structured and controlled and the ways in which armed forces are employed in battle. They will also influence the decision of when, and under what circumstances, to go to war. Once established, these patterns do not change quickly; in fact, they tend to reinforce themselves over time. It is usually only when a nation is faced with military defeat, or in victory suffers such staggering losses that change is forced upon it, that the catalyst is provided to re-examine its strategic assumptions. Even under these circumstances, however, the process of re-examination and reform is colored by cultural and historical imperatives over which the nation has little cognizance and less control.

What all this means for analysis is that it is not enough to compare static or material indicators of national power when assessing an adversary's capabilities, estimating his capacity for action, or attempting to forecast probable behavior.³ The analyst must also develop cultural empathy for the enemy. In particular, he must develop a sensitivity toward his adversary's style of strategic behavior. Military establishments and the political organizations that direct them are much more than featureless combinations of men and materiel; they are cultural systems that, while often manifesting certain basic similarities, almost invariably reveal distinctive behavioral and, hence, operational characteristics. If we hope to be able to forecast enemy behavior with greater accuracy than has been the case historically, it is important that we develop a sensitivity to what

¹ (London: Croom, Helm, 1973), p. 20.

² "Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception," in Donald C. Daniel and Katherine Harbo, eds., *Strategic Military Deception* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 33. See, also, Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³ For an elaboration on this theme, see Herbert Goldhamer, *Reality and Belief in Military Affairs* no. R-2448-NA Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1977).

FORUM

these characteristics are and how they are likely to influence action under varying circumstances. Having accomplished this, we will have gained important insights into the forces and parameters shaping the attitudes and policy choices of our opponents.

Failure to distinguish between differing styles of national behavior will result in culture-bound assessments of enemy activities. Rather than seeing events from the perspective of enemy decisionmakers, we will judge the actions of our opponents in terms of our own view of the world. Our adversaries, in short, will be conceived in our own image. Under these conditions any attempt to "get into the enemy's shoes" will not result in our seeing things from the often very different perspective of our opponents; it will simply result in our taking into consideration what we would do if faced with what we believe to be a similar set of circumstances and choices. The enemy, meanwhile, will be operating in a seemingly unpredictable fashion.

Such assessments have posed recurring problems for crisis warning and forecasting, not infrequently ending in surprise actions by the enemy. It is often assumed that surprise occurs because those charged with the business of warning failed to detect enemy preparations soon enough to sound the alarm. A brief look at the historical record, however, suggests that this has rarely been the case. In most instances of successful surprise attack, sufficient information was available for the surprised party to have forecasted enemy behavior accurately. The indicators or signals were there, but they were either ignored or interpreted incorrectly. Clearly, then, avoiding surprise is not simply a problem of detection, but very much a problem of assessment and acceptance. The roots of this problem can frequently be found in culturally biased evaluations of what the enemy is both capable of and likely to do. Insensitivity to the strategic style and behavioral predilections of one's adversary can lead to critical misperceptions concerning his motivations, operational objectives, parameters of action, and the political and military assumptions upon which any action will ultimately be based. This, in turn, will result in a notably reduced ability to anticipate enemy behavior.

The inability to shed cultural biases and develop an accurate understanding of the attitudes and behavior patterns of one's opponents has played a role in almost every major instance of strategic surprise in recent history, from the German invasion of the Soviet Union to the Japanese Pacific offensive in 1941. This is particularly evident in the case of the Japanese, where the gulf separating Western cultural traditions from those of the Orient made understanding more difficult than usual, and prejudice provided a comfortable alternative to empathy. Prior to World War II, for example, American and British observers found the Japanese to have "peculiarly slow brains," a trait attributed to "the strain put on the

FORUM

child's brain in learning some 6,000 Chinese characters before any real education starts." Similarly, "because of their slit eyes," it was widely believed that Japanese pilots could neither shoot straight nor see well in the dark.⁴ Even as perceptive an observer as Winston Churchill considered the Japanese to be prone to "irrational acts," expressing amazement that "the Japanese, having thrown away their opportunity to attack us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, so much less well armed, and all alone, should [in 1941] have plunged into a desperate struggle against the combined forces of the British Empire and the United States."⁵

While it seems evident that it is more difficult to develop empathy for truly foreign or dissimilar cultural systems, the fact that one's enemy is "close to home" is clearly no guarantee of understanding. Although Egypt and Israel have shared a common border since 1948, and have certainly had many opportunities for mutual observation, the Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal in 1973 took Israeli planners by complete surprise. One reason for this surprise was the Israelis' excessive reliance on assessments of the physical and qualitative balance of forces. Judging the balance to be in their favor, and assuming that the Egyptians would not be so foolish as to attack in the face of such superiority, the Israeli government chose not to respond to early indications that Egypt was preparing for war. In doing so they failed to appreciate the Egyptian need for "psychological recovery,"⁶ and the possibility that Sadat would initiate a war of limited objectives designed to achieve a political victory far short of the military defeat of Israel.

The Anglo-Argentine war in the Falklands provides a similar example. The fact that neither party in this conflict had a clear understanding of the strategic and political situation of its opponent has, in retrospect, become clear. The British, faced with certain warnings that the Argentines were preparing for an invasion, could not believe that they would actually attack. The Argentines, for their part, could not believe that having seized the Falklands, the British would actually go to the trouble to take them back. Each side was clearly surprised and not a little disappointed in the other.

In these and other instances, surprise resulted, first, not from a failure to observe the enemy's preparations for war, but from the failure to conclude that these preparations in fact presaged an attack. There are many reasons for such failings, ranging from organizational and proce-

⁴ Quoted in Arthur J. Marder, *Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Missions, 1936-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 347, 345.

⁵ Quoted in James Haldpath, *The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1915-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 181.

⁶ Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, p. 53.

FORUM

dural confusion to the incredulity of decisionmakers.⁷ Consequently, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively on any one of them as the source of the problem. In the cases discussed above, however, and in many other instances, an important factor contributing to surprise was the inability of intelligence observers and consumers to understand or perceive events from the enemy's point of view. This resulted in serious misjudgments concerning the nature of enemy planning, and ultimately to behavioral surprise. This problem was naturally compounded by the uncertainty inherent in behavioral prediction and the fact that, in times of crisis, assessments must be made quickly, on the basis of incomplete, often ambiguous, and sometimes contradictory information. The fact that this is so, however, only reinforces the need to interpret what information is available in terms of an accurate paradigm of enemy behavior.

Recognition of the need to take into account the cultural and historical foundations of national behavior has been surprisingly late in coming to the strategic community. This failing has been due, in part, to the character of the Western military heritage, which, in emphasizing the material over the psychological dimensions of strategy, has shown little evidence of concern for the manner in which the forces of tradition influence when, where, and how nations go to war. As Sir Charles Oman noted some years ago in his seminal work on warfare in the Middle Ages: "For centuries war was studied as an art in the East, while in the West it remained largely a matter of hard fighting."⁸ The truth of this statement has been reflected time and again not only in the history of Western military operations, but also in the writings of mainstream Western military theorists, who almost without exception have neglected the subjective dimension of strategic behavior in their attempt to reduce warfare to an exact science, applicable across time and space.⁹

Even today, what is known in principle is seldom accomplished, or at least accomplished well, in practice. Though we hear frequent references to the concept of military style and, indeed, are generally prepared to believe that differing styles of war do in fact exist, when faced with an immediate need to assess enemy behavior, we are quick to resort to the assumption of rationality discussed above. Such an approach is easy, gives the appearance of being rigorous, and offers the (false) promise of definitive results.

Cultural and historical experiences, however, play an important role in determining the manner in which national strategy is con-

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ceived and executed. To the extent that we are products of our own past, they also have an important influence on the way we interpret and predict enemy behavior. This occurs directly when we interpret the meaning of events in terms of our own perspectives of what is significant and what is not, and, indirectly, when our perceptions become a filter that distorts our observation of enemy activities, predisposing us to pay attention to certain events or types of information and not to others. If we hope to avoid unpleasant surprises in the future, we must guard against the tendency to see the enemy as we see ourselves. Behavioral predictions are, in the end, no better than the assumptions upon which they are based. It is essential, therefore, that the assumptions we use in assessing the actions of our opponents accurately reflect their view of the world and established military style.

GORDON H. MCCORMICK

Dealing with the Unexpected*

Given our security interests, the nature of the threats before us, and the need to prevent inadvertent escalation, we would obviously prefer to deter war, as opposed to having to undo at great and possibly intolerable cost the consequences of an enemy attack. But we cannot afford to defend against all threats with the degree of confidence that conservative military planners would consider adequate.¹ Nor can we try to get by cheaply with expedients like all-purpose nuclear deterrents. Instead we have to make assessments about what risks can be tolerated and seek, where possible, to acquire relatively inexpensive kinds of insurance to deter, detect, and respond to enemy action.

One of the most important ways of helping support both of these aims is by intelligence gathering and assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions. If we are competent in these pursuits, we can relieve some time pressures in a crisis, better distribute scarce resources among a broad range of obligations, reap some political rewards, and enjoy the luxury of a longer-term perspective for planning, should we choose to exploit it.

Unfortunately, intelligence, warning, and allied measures (like

⁷ For an excellent discussion of the sources of surprise, see Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington: Brookings, 1962), pp. 87, 149.

⁸ C. W. C. Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1885), p. 29.

⁹ For a brief discussion of the pseudo-rational character of Western military theory, see Yehoshua (I) Harkabi, *Theory and Doctrine in Classical and Modern Strategy*, Working Paper no. 35 (Washington International Security Studies Program: The Wilson Center, 1981).

* The views expressed in this article are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Rand Corporation or any of its sponsors.

¹ The joint chiefs of staff regularly estimate the forces needed to satisfy the full range of U.S. security requirements with high confidence in their annual Joint Strategic Planning Document (formerly the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan). The required force structure exceeds by a considerable degree the actual defense budget.

READING Material For The Course

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VOLUME XII • NUMBER 2, SPRING 1982

Presidential Studies Quarterly

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

Editor: R. GORDON HOXIE

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Book Review Editors: KENNETH E. DAVISON and THOMAS E. CRONIN

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WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE TRUMAN-EISENHOWER LEGACIES**

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RUTH P. MORGAN

THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY*

by

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY

Director of Central Intelligence

Recognition of the need for intelligence concerning the intentions of our adversaries is as old as the nation itself. During the War of Independence General Washington observed:

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for the want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue.

During the first 165 years of our nation's history, however, we were able to exist behind the security of wide oceans and friendly borders and the need for intelligence was episodic. The world changed drastically for America in general, and for the fledgling intelligence community in particular, on December 7, 1941 and, for better or worse, it will never again be the same. The United States no longer enjoys the splendid isolation that its oceans and borders once provided, and it must now exist in a world in which the minimum period of warning in the event of nuclear attack is counted in less than 20 minutes.

As a result, we have today a national intelligence community made up of more scholars in the social and physical sciences than any campus can boast. It uses photography, electronics, acoustics and other technological marvels to gather facts from the four corners of the globe and informs the public, as we saw in the SALT debate, of the precise capabilities of weapons on

the other side of the globe which the Soviets keep most secret.

The first priority in our intelligence work is still the Soviet Union. It is the only country in the world with major weapons systems directly targeted at the United States which could destroy the U.S. in half an hour. We put the largest slice of our resources into the task of understanding Soviet military capabilities, which have grown enormously in precision, accuracy and sophistication as well as power.

Our superior technology defends against Soviet military advantages in manpower and sheer volume of weaponry. A television documentary on the KGB shown by the Canadian Broadcasting Company a few months ago, for example, concluded that the theft of inertial guidance technology by Soviet intelligence improved the accuracy of Soviet ICBM's and made U.S. land-based missiles vulnerable, thereby creating the need to build the MX missile system as a replacement at a cost of 30 to 60 billion dollars.

The Soviet political and military services, KGB and GRU, have for years been training young scientists, to target and roam the world to acquire technology for their military arsenal from the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and anywhere else. They have acquired technology worth many billions by purchase, legal and illegal, by theft, by espionage, by bribery, by scientific exchanges and by exploiting our open literature and our Freedom of Information Act.

George Washington, wherever he is, and people in other countries, must find it puzzling that our Government permits any person, including an officer of an antagonistic intelligence service, to apply for documents from our intelligence records and demand lengthy legal justification if they are denied.

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* This essay is based upon an address delivered by Director Casey March 13, 1982 in Washington D.C. at the Thirteenth Annual Student Symposium sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

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A law that is grounded in the presumption that all Government records should be accessible to the public, unless the Government can justify in detail a compelling national security rationale for withholding them, *unwarrantedly* disrupts the effective operation of an intelligence agency.

Thus for reasons of security as well as efficiency, there is a strong current of opinion in this Administration—and I believe in the Congress and the public—in favor of some modification of the Freedom of Information Act and other questionable burdens imposed on intelligence and other Government activities. I wish to emphasize that this does not represent a retreat from our Government's historic and cherished commitment to protecting essential liberties. But we should bear in mind, as Justice Goldberg once said, that "while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."

Secrecy is essential to any intelligence organization. Ironically, secrecy is accepted without protest in many areas of our society. Physicians, lawyers, clergymen, and grand juries, journalists, income tax returns, crop futures—all have confidential aspects protected by law. Why should national security information be entitled to any less protection?

There was a time when intelligence had most of its job done when it had counted and measured the capabilities of weapons of destruction, followed indications and warnings of their use and passed this information to the military for appropriate action.

Today we also need to assess and deal with a whole range of initiatives and tactics—diplomacy, subversion, disinformation, destabilization, provision of sophisticated weapons, support and exploitation of terrorism and insurgency.

The emergence of this new array of intangible weapons which influence, erode and undermine on a worldwide scale places a wholly different and far wider responsibility on intelligence. It is a responsibility which was neglected as the Intelligence Community lost 50% of its people and 40% of its funding during the 1970s

and, at the time, was forced to give high priority to following a Soviet military and political threat growing rapidly in magnitude and in sophistication.

We face a skill in propaganda which continually puts us at a disadvantage. While American intelligence has shown the Soviets carrying off the biggest peacetime military buildup in history, deploying over 200 missiles targeted at Western Europe and using chemical and bacteriological weapons against women and children in Afghanistan and Indo-China, they have succeeded in painting the United States as the threat to peace.

This is accomplished through their political and intelligence apparatus in a far-flung and many-sided campaign of what they call active measures. Our intelligence must continue to identify the distortions of this propaganda and establish the truths to combat it.

If we look beyond Europe where a combination of these active measures and not too subtle intimidation seeks to divide us from our allies, we see the other continents of the world plagued and beleaguered by subversion and witch's brew of destabilization, terrorism and insurgency fueled by Soviet arms, Cuban manpower and Libyan money, with East Germany, North Korea, and the PLO chipping in special skills and experience. It's important to understand how all this works.

Beginning in 1974 and 1975, the Soviet Union undertook a new, much more aggressive strategy in the Third World. They found destabilization, subversion and the backing of insurgents in other countries around the world attractive and relatively risk free. Exploiting the availability first of Cuba and subsequently of other countries to serve as Soviet surrogates or proxies, they have been able to limit the political, economic and military cost of intervention.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Soviet Union soon began to test whether the U.S. would resist foreign-provoked and supported instability and insurgence elsewhere in the Third World. Fully aware of the political climate in this country, in the 1970s they developed an aggressive strategy in the Third World. It avoided direct

confrontation and instead exploited local and regional circumstances to take maximum advantage of third-country forces (or surrogates) to attain Soviet objectives. This enables Moscow to deny involvement, to label such conflicts as internal, and to warn self-righteously against "outside interference." There is little disagreement among analysts that Soviet and proxy successes in the mid- to late-70s in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Nicaragua and elsewhere have encouraged the Soviets to rely on and support the Cubans, Vietnamese and, recently, the Libyans ever more aggressively.

Over the last several years, the Soviets and their allies have supported, directly or indirectly, radical regimes or insurgencies in more than a dozen countries in every part of the Third World. The United States and its friends have had difficulty countering these insurgencies. It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace and economic stability of a small country.

It's truly remarkable the way the combination of money and manpower from two tiny countries, Cuba and Libya, with skills and arms provided by the Soviet Union and its satellites like Vietnam, North Korea, and East Germany, has terrorized four continents over the last ten years.

Subversion and terrorism destabilize existing governments. Insurgency is organized and supplied with weapons and experienced guerrilla leaders. Manpower is brought for training to Cuba, Lebanon, South Yemen, Bulgaria or Libya, where terrorists training camps seem to make up the second largest industry next to oil.

Terrorism, the sophisticated terrorism of today, is big business and requires big money. Safehouses in safe areas, modern secure weapons, travel documents, transportation, etc., are very expensive. Terrorists need more than money. They require safe training sites, use of diplomatic bags, safe embassies, multiple travel documents, they need a country to back them. Qadhafi has been picking up a large

slice of this and has attempted—by act or by *just leaks* of an act—to strike at senior American officials at home and abroad. In so doing he has caused disruption of our normal way of life on the official level, the expenditure of millions, and some degree of skepticism among our allies about our intelligence and subsequent actions. All this at very little cost and a great deal of "revolutionary" publicity for him. He also, at one time or another, tried to assassinate Nimeriri and Sadat, his neighbors in Sudan and Egypt.

Cuba is the other worldwide troublemaker. For a nation of ten million people, Cuba has displayed a remarkable reach on a worldwide scale. It has 70,000 military and civilian advisors abroad in almost 30 countries. Of these more than half are military. Over 40,000 are in Africa, and some 7,000 in the Middle East. There are 12,000 Cuban technical trainees working in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and 5-6,000 studying in the Soviet Union.

How did this phenomenon develop? Part of it springs from the demographics—the same source—a combination of overpopulation and youth unemployment—which gave us 150,000 Cuban refugees in the Mariel boat lift. Since 1980, there has been a surge in the 15-19 year old age group of 50 percent. Castro has admitted that tens of thousands of youths are out of work. He said in a recent speech that he would like to send 10,000 Cuban youths to Siberia to cut timber for Cuban construction projects. They have lots of young men to train and send into other countries—and that's the way to get preferment in government employment in Castro's Cuba.

The other source of Cuba's aggression is Soviet influence and support. The Soviets sell their weapons. Arms sales earn about 20 percent of their hard currency. Last year they gave Cuba four times the previous ten-year annual average.

In addition to free military equipment, the Soviet Union gives Cuba \$8 million a day, or \$3 billion a year, to keep its economy going. The Russians buy sugar at a premium and sell oil at a discount. There is no way that Cuba could play the

role it does in the Middle East military support. Moscow doesn't want a year unless

Today Cuba with a modicum of troops, reservists, MIGs. It now has a establishment in the area to save those of

Cuba's recent role in Angola and Ethiopia is overwhelming. Cuba's sense of superiority in military capability is particularly evident in the Middle East. This is a source of violence and instability in the Middle East, but it is not clear what would happen if Cuba's exploit of its military in Nicaragua and the government of Angola is terminated. At the moment the government is providing financial support to Cuban organizations in the area. It has been years to group in the area.

Today, we are facing a challenging world. It may be by the end of the century, we will have a more effective intelligence system to help us judge the intentions and motivations of the world with interests in changing economic conditions worldwide, before it threatens

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role it does in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East without this cash and military support from the Soviet Union. Moscow doesn't give away \$3 to \$4 billion a year unless they have a purpose.

Today Cuba sits astride the Caribbean with a modernized army of 150,000 troops, reserves of 100,000 and 200 Soviet MIGs. It now has the largest military establishment in the Western Hemisphere, save those of the U.S. and Brazil.

Cuba's recent combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia, together with its overwhelming qualitative and numerical superiority in weapons, provides it with a particularly ominous intervention capability in the Caribbean and Central America. This is clearly not the sole source of violence and instability in the Caribbean Basin, but it magnifies and internationalizes what would otherwise be local conflicts. Cuba's most immediate goals are to exploit and control the revolution in Nicaragua and to induce the overthrow of the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, the Cuban government is providing advice, safehaven, communications, training and some financial support to several South American organizations. Training in Cuban camps has been provided in the last two years to groups from a dozen Latin American countries.

Today, we live in an extraordinarily challenging world. Protected though we may be by military might and economic strength, we are vulnerable without an effective intelligence service. We need it to help us judge the capabilities and intentions and monitor the activities of those with interests adverse to ours, to evaluate changing economic and political trends worldwide, and to anticipate danger before it threatens.

Your generation is the first in this century to grow entirely to maturity in a world where the United States is being actively pressed to defend its role as the foremost economic and industrial power in the world. We now face competition from others in the free world, but we are still very much a great nation and power. Any country that can successfully engineer a feat like the flawless launch and recovery of the Columbia space shuttle has adequate resources and resolve to retain its position as leader of the free world. We all can take great pride in that magnificent achievement.

We nevertheless must recognize that we are now challenged as never before by military and commercial competitors of unprecedented strength. We can not rest on past achievements. We have permitted our own resources, both material and spiritual, to be drawn down. In the private sector, we have allowed an alarming decline in productivity and hence in our ability to compete in world markets. In the governmental sector, we have continually exhausted our reserves and then borrowed to cover the shortfall, compounding the inflationary pressure on interest rates and sapping public confidence in the Government's ability to control expenditures.

These trends must not be allowed to continue. We must trim the fat, revitalize our institutions and reaffirm our will and purpose to work for peace and freedom.

Critical to this are the human resources in which this nation has always been so rich, young people with good minds and good educations, with energy and enthusiasm and the confidence to tackle the difficulties ahead of us. You will meet that challenge.